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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD PERSON:
PERCEPTUAL BIASES OF MEDIA HARMS & CRIES FOR
GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP
Clay Calvert*
[I]t is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having
been adversely affected by the information whose dis-
semination is to be prohibited. Even the censor's
friends are usually safe from pollution. It is the general
public that must be protected.'
A primary issue in First Amendment 2 jurispru-
dence is determining when harm caused by ex-
pression is sufficient to abridge an individual's or
entity's freedom of speech. 3 Because an "absolu-
tist" interpretation of the First Amendment never
has been adopted by the United States Supreme
Court,4 "[1]ine drawing is inevitable as to what
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* 1 W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communi-
cation, 47 PuB. OPINION Q. 1, 14 (1983).
2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides in relevant part that Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses
are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local governments. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
3 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
4 (1992) (stating that "we ponder when it is appropriate for
the state to control public discourse for the perceived greater
good").
4 Despite the literal language of the First Amendment
that suggests that Congress can never make any law abridging
freedom of speech, "[t] he fact is that First Amendment law is
far more complex than the Constitution's command." JOHN
H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
READER 169 (2d ed. 1996). "Although the First Amendment
is written in absolute language that Congress shall make 'no
law,' the Supreme Court never has accepted the view that the
First Amendment prohibits all government regulation of ex-
pression." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 750 (1997).
5 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 751. Bollinger observes
that "since no one has ever been willing to contend that every
speech act under all circumstances should be protected, we
speech will be protected. ' 5 Courts must strike a
balance between the values of freedom of expres-
sion 6 and the government's regulatory interest in
punishing or stopping speech.
7
The government's interest inevitably involves
either preventing or compensating for harm al-
legedly caused by speech.8 Libel law, for instance,
compensates for reputational harm allegedly
caused by defamatory falsehoods. 9  Indecent
broadcast speech is regulated because of the,
harm it allegedly causes children.' 0 Televised
must necessarily embark on a decisional process of exclusion
and inclusion for which we very quickly find we need some
theoretical guidance beyond what the language itself offers."
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 5-6 (1986).
6 Traditional values of free expression embodied in First
Amendment jurisprudence range from discovery of the truth
and promoting democratic self-governance to self-realization
and self-fulfillment. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, To-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15
(1966) (describing the functions of freedom of expression in
a democratic society and identifying individual self-fulfill-
ment, attainment of the truth, participation in decision-mak-
ing, and balancing stability and change as values of free
speech). It has been observed that "[a]cceptance of one ra-
tionale need not bump another from the list, as if this were
First Amendment musical chairs." SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 5.
7 See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 792
(2d ed. 1988). In striking that balance, the dominant First
Amendment ideology is that "[h]urtful speech might con-
ceivably be of some value to society and therefore the proper
answer to that speech is not censorship, but more speech."
David S. Allen, Freeing the First Amendment: An Introduction, in
FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3, 4 (David S. Allen & Robert
Jensen eds., 1995).
8 See HARRY WHITE, ANATOMY OF CENSORSHIP: WHY THE
CENSORS HAVE IT WRONG 41 (1997) (observing that the ra-
tionale "[t] hat certain expression needs to be prohibited be-
cause of the harm it causes remains for many the censors
(sic) most powerful and compelling argument").
9 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341
(1974).
10 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the government "has
an independent and compelling interest in preventing mi-
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images of violence are regulated in the name of
reducing aggressive behavior and real-life vio-
lence." Efforts are made to regulate pornogra-
phy because of the harm it causes women and so-
ciety.1 2 Cigarette advertising is restricted in the
name of preventing teens from starting the harm-
ful behavior of smoking. 
13
As a society, we fear the harmful effects of these
and other media-propagated images.' 4 Suscepti-
bility to the influence of mass media messages is,
after all, a quality that we intuitively and readily
ascribe to others. 15 We often develop, in turn,
laws based on our beliefs and assumptions about
the harmful effects of media messages on others.
But what if our beliefs and perceptions about
alleged media harms are systematically wrong?
What if we, in fact, typically overestimate the harm
caused by mass media messages? What if we un-
necessarily censor speech?
There is a strong and growing body of empiri-
cal social science research from the field of com-
munication that suggests that much of our First
Amendment jurisprudence and efforts to censor
speech may be radically off base. Specifically, the
research supports what has been called the third-
person effect hypothesis. 16
The hypothesis "predicts that people will tend
to overestimate the influence that mass communi-
cations have on the attitudes and behavior of
nors from being exposed to indecent broadcasts").
11 The Parental Choice in Television Programming sec-
tion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 calls for the es-
tablishment of a television ratings code for programs that
contain violent or sexual content. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)
(Supp. 1997). See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Reconceptualiz-
ing Ratings: From Censorship to Marketplace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENr. L.J. 403 (1997) (describing the Parental Choice in Tele-
communications Programming section and alternatives to
it).
12 See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985).
13 See 21 C.F.R. § 897.2 (1997). In April, 1997, a federal
district court judge ruled that although the FDA had jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products, it was beyond the scope of its au-
thority to enforce the new advertising regulations. See John
Schwartz, judge Rules that FDA Can Regulate Tobacco, WAsH.
POST, Apr. 26, 1997, at Al.
14 "[T]he effects of the mass media are a major concern
in our society-a concern, incidentally, that has existed since
the beginning of mass communication when monarchs and
religious leaders stifled printing to curb political dissent, re-
form, and new ideas that threatened the established order."
JAMES WILSON AND STAN LE Roy WILSON, MASS MEDIA/MASS
CUUIURE 407-08 (4th ed. 1998).
15 See Albert C. Gunther & Paul Mundy, Biased Optimism
and the Third-Person Effect, 70 JOURNALISM Q. 58, 58 (1993).
16 See Davison, supra note 1, at 3.
others." 17 Parsed differently, the hypothesis, as
originally articulated in 1983 by W. Phillips
Davison, holds that "[i] n the view of those trying
to evaluate the effects of a communication, its
greatest impact will not be on 'me' or 'you,' but
on 'them'-the third persons.""'
Now, 15 years and many empirical experiments
and studies later, evidence supports this hypothe-
sis. u That evidence has disturbing ramifications
for extant and future First Amendment jurispru-
dence. It suggests the government may be unnec-
essarily censoring speech based on a perceptual
bias about its effects on others.
An example-censorship of sexually explicit
speech-makes the danger clear. Empirical re-
search suggests that people systematically judge
others to be more negatively influenced by por-
nography than themselves. 20 In turn, people
"favor restrictions on pornography in line with
their perceptions of effects on others. '"2 1 This is
important because some experimental research
also suggests that people systematically overesti-
mate media effects on others. 22 The ramifica-
tions, communication researcher Albert C. Gun-
ther of the University of Wisconsin-Madison
notes, are profound - "if people are systematically
overestimating the negative social-level effects of
pornography, then the third-person effect may be




19 See Vincent Price et al., Third-Person Effects of News Cov-
erage: Orientations Toward Media, 74 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 525, 525 (1997) (stating that the third person ef-
fect "has been well documented by more than a decade of
empirical study").
20) See Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-Rating: The
Third-Person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography,
J. COMM., Winter 1995, at 27, 35.
21 See id. at 36.
22 See id. at n.10. See also Hernando Rojas et al., For the
Good of Others: Censorship and Third Person Effect, 8 INT'LJ. PUB.
OPINION RES. 163, 182 (1996) (reporting the results of an
empirical study on the third person effect and concluding
that "[a] significant part of the apprehension caused by me-
dia effects results from the overestimation of its effects on
others"). An alternative explanation, of course, would be
that people underestimate the actual influence on them-
selves while they accurately estimate the influence on others.
Research, however, rebuts this self-underestimation explana-
tion, with Douglas M. McLeod of the University of Delaware
and his colleagues observing that "[flor the most part, the
literature indicates that people do in fact overestimate the
effects of media content on others." Douglas M. McLeod et
al., Support for Censorship of Violent and Misongynic Rap Lyrics,
24 COMM. RES. 153, 155 (1997).
2 Gunther, supra note 20, at 37.
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The finding is not limited, however, to porno-
graphic speech. Recent empirical research also
supports the third-person effect hypothesis in the
context of perceptions about harm caused by-
and the need for censorship of-rap music.
24
Douglas M. McLeod of the University of Delaware
and his colleagues conducted a survey on the rela-
tionship between third-person effects and censor-
ship of rap lyrics. 25 They found both that partici-
pants in the study perceived others to be more
influenced by rap lyrics and that "this perception
was strongly related to support for censorship,
even after controlling for other important vari-
ables."26  In particular, McLeod and his col-
leagues found that the "impact of third-person
perceptions on support for censorship was strong
despite controlling for several correlates- of cen-
sorship (gender, conservatism, social desirability
of the content and knowledge of and liking of the
content in question)." 27 They conclude "[i]f it is
the case (as research seems to indicate) that third-
person perceptions are based on an overestima-
tion of effects on others, the desire for censorship
caused by third-person perceptions is built on a
flawed foundation. Any censorship that results
from misperceptions may in fact be unnecessary
censorship.1
2 s
Other research suggests, in the context of defa-
mation by the media, people may overestimate
the extent of reputational injury caused by a de-
famatory statement and, as a result, overcompen-
sate plaintiffs with excessive monetary damages.
29
Inflated awards against the press that often cause
a chilling effect on investigative reporting, in
other words, may be based on biased perceptions
and assumptions.
30
24 See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 165.
25 See id. at 160-61.
26 Id. at 165.
27 Id. at 168.
28 See id. at 165.
29 SeeJeremy Cohen et al., Perceived Impact of Defamation:
An Experiment on Third-Person Effects, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 161,
172 (1988).
SO See generally David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Cen-
sorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422 (1975) (describing the impact of
large damage awards in libel cases on journalism).
3.1 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part I1.
33 JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH
IN COMMUNICATION AND LAw 110 (1990).
34 Id. at 109. Social science data used to inform legisla-
tive judgment in making laws are called "legislative facts."
JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw:
CASES AND MATERIALS 143 (3d ed. 1994) (citing Kenneth
In summary, our false assumptions about media
effects may lead to legislation and jury verdicts in
a wide range of areas that erroneously punish
freedom of expression. That is the profound dan-
ger of legal scholars and legislators who choose to
ignore-or who simply are unaware of-the grow-
ing body of social science research on the third-
person effect.
Bridging social science and law, this interdisci-
plinary article initially explains the third-person
effect and presents an overview of some of the re-
search conducted to date that has been published
in peer-reviewed social science journals.3 The ar-
ticle then explores the implications of this re-
search for First Amendment jurisprudence.
32
Although it is clear that "[f]aw is not lame with-
out social science [,]" 33 communication science
"may play an important role in the development
of legal theory."34  Largely ignored by First
Amendment scholars until now,3 5 the third-per-
son effect research requires legal attention-it
suggests thatjudges, legislators, and juries may be
overestimating the harmful effects of mass com-
munication messages and, as a result, unnecessa-
rily censoring and punishing individuals and enti-
ties for their speech.
3"
I. THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT
The third-person effect, in a nutshell, "predicts
that people perceive greater persuasive media in-
fluence on other people than on themselves.
'3 7 It
seems to be "one variant of a general belief that
the outcomes of some event will be more unfavor-
able at the societal level (for other people) than
at the personal level (for me)." 38 It is a "percep-
Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Adminis-
trative Process, HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942)).
35 The third-person effect research has been mentioned
briefly in passing in only two law journal articles. See Clay
Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the
Impact of Denial of Defamatory Allegations, 26 PAC. L:J. 933, 937
n.31 (1995); David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Sci-
ence and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 92 (1991).
36 See Price et al., supra note 19 (stating that the "ten-
dency to .perceive that other people are more greatly influ-
enced by the media than ourselves could well have important
consequences" including "even legal ramifications").
37 Paul D. Driscoll & Michael B. Salwen, Self-Perceived
Knowledge of the O.J. Simpson Trial: Third-Person Perception and
Perceptions of Guilt, 74JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 541, 551
(1997).
"8 L. Erwin Atwood, Illusions of Media Power: The Third-Per-
son Effect, 71 JOURNALISM Q. 269, 279 n.I (1994).
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tual phenomenon" 39 that is based on "inferential
biases [in] the assignment of mass media ef-
fects." 4o
Today, a large number of studies provide
"abundant support for the notion that individuals
assume that communications exert a stronger in-
fluence on others than on themselves." 41 What's
more, a "significant part of the apprehension
caused by media effects results from the overesti-
mation of its effects on others."42 The remainder
of this Part of the article elaborates on the third-
person effect and some of the research conducted
that illustrates and explains its existence.
A. Components of the Third-Person Effect
The third-person effect hypothesis has two com-
ponents-a perceptual bias and a behavioral re-
sponse in conformity with that perceptual bias.
43
The perceptual bias-that people will estimate ef-
fects of media messages on themselves to be less
than the effects on others-has considerable em-
pirical support.44  A 1993 review by Richard
Perloff of the third-person research conducted
from 1983 through 1992 revealed support for the
perceptual bias component of the third-person ef-
fect in 13 of 14 studies.
45
In his seminal work on the third-person hypoth-
esis, Davison used an anecdote to illustrate the
perceptual bias. 411 He asked journalists a series of
questions about how much they thought their
newspaper editorials had influenced the thinking
of their readers. 47 Davison was struck by "the ex-
tent to which many journalists were convinced
that editorials had an effect on other people's atti-
tudes, while discounting the effect on people like
themselves."48 This personal observation and
others led to his formation of the third-person ef-
fect hypothesis.
491
This perceptual bias may relate in some circum-
39 Price et al., supra note 19.
40 Atwood, supra note 38, at 270.
41 Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 165.
42 Id. at 182.
43 See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 154.
44 See id.
45 See Richard M. Perloff, Third-Person Effect Research 1983-
1992: A Review and Synthesis, 5 INT'LJ. PUB. OPINION RES. 167
(1993).
46 See Davison, supra note 1, at 2.
47 See id.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 3.
50 See Gunther & Mundy, supra note 15, at 60.
stances to what has been called biased optimism.5 0
Biased optimism is "the tendency for people to
think they are less likely to have negative or unde-
sirable experiences than others."15  This is a form
of ego enhancement, and research suggests that
people attribute particularly savvy responses to
themselves to bolster their own sense of compe-
tence and self-worth.
5 2
The research also suggests that the perceptual
bias component of the third-person effect is
greater when message content is deemed to be
negative. 53 Positive or desirable messages, on the
other hand, are less likely to elicit the third-per-
son effect.54 This suggests that people who per-
ceive particular media messages as harmful or
negative are more likely to be subject to the third-
person effect with regard to the impact of those
messages. In a nutshell, "it seems that messages
considered harmful, dangerous, or more broadly,
schema discrepant, are those most likely to elicit
the third-person effect in communication.."55 In
addition, individuals who are more involved in a
topic-who have stronger views-are more
predisposed to the third-person effect.
56
The danger for censorship arises when the
perceptual bias is linked with a behavioral compo-
nent-that biased perceptions of media effects re-
sult in behavior, such as laws and regulations, in-
tended to protect the public from the perceived
negative effects of media messages. 5 7 As McLeod
and his colleagues state, "few media researchers
would dispute the importance of a perceptual bias
that leads to support for censorship. "58
Although there is less support for the behav-
ioral component, three empirical studies pub
lished in the past three years have found support
for it in the areas of censorship of pornography,
television violence, and rap lyrics. 59 These, of
course, are three of the hottest areas today in
which regulations have either been called for or
51 Id.
52 See id. at 66-67. Gunther and Mundy found "that while
the third-person phenomenon is indeed a robust effect, it re-
sults at least in part from people's tendency toward an opti-
mistic bias in making judgments about the differences be-
tween themselves and others." Id. at 66.
53 See Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 166.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 167.
56 See Price et al., supra note 19, at 526.
57 See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 154-55, 157.
58 Id. at 168.
59 See Gunther, supra note 20, at 36; See McLeod et al.,
supra note 22, at 168; See Rojas, et al., supra note 22, at 182.
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enacted. On the other hand, another study found
a lack of empirical support for the behavioral
component of the third-person effect in the con-
text of calls for restricting press coverage of crimi-
nal trials.60
The fact that a trio of recent studies supports
the behavioral component-namely, calls for cen-
sorship-of the third-person effect cannot be ig-
nored. Future replications of these studies may
confirm the earlier findings of the link between
the perceptual bias and behavioral response to
that bias. As noted above, individuals are more
predisposed to the third-person effect when
messages are perceived as having negative conse-
quences.61 People have long perceived media
portrayals of violence and pornography as having
negative consequences. 62 Thus it is not surprising
to find the existence of a third-person effect in
these areas, and it would not be surprising to find
such an effect in other areas involving "negative"
messages such as cigarette and alcohol advertis-
ing.
63
B. Some Limitations on the Research Findings
Whether the third-person perception actually
causes censorship is not something that social sci-
ence research can definitively prove. John
Monahan and Laurens Walker write in Social Sci-
ence in Law "that social science research (or, in-
deed, research in any other area of science, in-
cluding physics) never 'proves' anything in the
sense of concluding that any assertion is abso-
lutely true or absolutely false. Rather, it assigns a
probability to the truth or falsity of assertions that
are tested."6 4 Statistical procedures can only de-
termine the probability that an observed differ-
ence or change noted in a experiment or survey
was caused by chance.6 5 When researchers state
that their findings achieved statistical significance,
this "does not prove that the variables being inves-
60 See Michael B. Salwen & Paul D. Driscoll, Consequences
of Third-Person Perception in Support of Press Restrictions in the
O.J. Simpson Trial, J. COMM., Spring 1997, at 60, 72. This
study, however, used the O.J. Simpson case-a truly aberrant
criminal matter-as its focus.
61 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62 See Leon Friedman, Symposium Introduction, 22 HOF-
sTRA L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1994).
63 See Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 182-83 (suggesting the
third-person effect may be applicable to a number of adver-
tising issues including ads for potentially harmful products).
64 MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 34, at 79.
tigated caused the difference, it only says that the
difference exists and is probably not just a ran-
dom occurrence.."66 The survey data used to
demonstrate the relationship between a percep-
tual bias and calls for censorship thus can at best
show a correlation but not causation.
Despite these limitations, the empirical data are
there for legal scholars and legislators to consider.
The next part of this article argues that the data
should not, at the very least, be ignored by those
who advocate censorship of mass media messages
because of their supposedly harmful conse-
quences.
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The legal ramifications of the third-person re-
search are profound. We may be censoring and
punishing speech conveyed by the mass media un-
necessarily and without justification. As Her-
nando Rojas and his colleagues observed recently
in the International Journal of Public Opinion Re-
search, "If part of the drive to curtail certain types
of messages results from the third-person effect,
policy debates have to recognize this and concen-
trate on measuring actual media effects and not
perceived media effects.
'67
Unfortunately, there is no debate in the legal
community about this issue. Legal scholars and
legislators have ignored the crucial body of social
science research on the third-person effect. Calls
for censorship, instead, are based largely on
hunches and assumptions about media effects
that are tainted by perceptual biases. Most dis-
turbingly, the research is ignored at a time when
censorship has become one of the most salient is-
sues in American society.68
Censorship, of course, "is a social instinct."69
Media messages, in turn, have long been a target
of this social instinct.70  Motion pictures were
targeted as far back as the 1920s for their alleg-
65 See id.
66 THOMAS R. BLACK, EVALUATING SOCIAL SCIENCE RE-
SEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (1993).
67 Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 182 (emphasis added).
68 See Richard Hense & Christian Wright, The Development
of the Attitudes Toward Censorship Questionnaire, 22 J. APPLIED.
Soc. PSCYHOL. 1666 (1992). "[F]ree speech is in more
trouble today than it has been in decades." Kathleen Peratis,
Banning Speech Does Not Cure Social Ills, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv.
801, 803 (1994).
69 SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 4.
70 "[T]he mass media have the potential to influence au-
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edly harmful effects on children 7' and, in fact,
once were not recognized by the United States
Supreme Court as a form of protected speech
under the First Amendment. 72 During the 1980s,
books were "the most challenged form of expres-
sion."7 - Today, "[tlelevision is perhaps the favor-
ite target of powerful effects critics . . . [and]
video games are a close second favorite."
74
Our social instincts about the direct and power-
ful effects of the media, however, are extremely
naive. Communication researchers long ago re-
jected what has been described as the magic bul-
let theory or hypodermic needle theory of direct,
powerful, and largely uniform media effects on
audience members.75 Despite this fact, many peo-
ple still believe that media messages can have di-
rect and powerful effects on an essentially passive
audience. 76 In brief, the bullet theory held that
"[m] essages only had to be loaded, directed at the
target and fired; if they hit the target audience,
then the expected response would be forthcom-
dience behavior, and throtghotLt the years there has been an
expression of social concern over the extent of this
power... some of this concern has been reflected in formal
and informal controls over the media." JOSEPii R. DOMINICK,
THE DYNAMICS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 548 (5th ed. 1996).
71 SHEARON A. LOWERY & MELVIN L. DEFLEUR, MILE-
STONES IN MASS COMMUNICA\TION RESEARCH 23-24 (3d ed.
1995).
72 See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio,
236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). Motion pictures did not receive
First Amendment protection as speech until 1952. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (.1952).
73 'JOHN B. HARER & STEVEN R. HARRIS, CENSORSIIIP OF
EXPRESSION IN THE 1980s 123 (1994).
74 JAY BLACK ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MEDIA COMMUNI-
CATION 38 (5th ed. 1998).
75 See WERNERJ. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COM-
MUNICATION THEORIES: ORIGINS, METHODS, AND USES IN THE
MASS Media 247 (3d ed. 1992).
76 See id.
77 BLACK ET AL., supra note 74, at 38. It has been sug-
gested that the bullet theory was really never adopted by
communication researchers but merely a straw-man theory
set up for purposes of comparison. See Steven H. Chaffee &
John L. Hochheimer, The Beginnings of Political Communication
Research in the United States: Origins of the "Limited Effects"
Model, in THE MEDIA RFVOLUTION IN AMERICA AND IN WESTERN
EUROPE 267 (Everett M. Rogers & Francis Balle eds. 1985).
78 SeeJeremy Cohen & Albert C. Gunther, Libel as Com-
munication Phenomena, COMM. & LAw, Oct. 1987, at 9, 27 (ob-
serving that communications "researchers view communica-
tion as a process containing a series of steps within complex
interactions among people. Normally, people neither re-
ceive, nor act on, communication in a void.").
79 The media, for instance, are very effective in setting
the public's agenda-telling people what issues are salient
and worthy of discussion. See Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald
L. Shaw, The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five
ing."7 7
Communication is, of course, a much more
complex process with any number of variables
and contingent conditions influencing the ulti-
mate impact of a message on the recipient. 78 Me-
dia messages certainly do have effects, but they
are not all-powerful as we often assume. 7" Their
impact may be mediated by factors such as selec-
tive perception, 0 involvement,8 ' and source cred-
ibility.8 2 In brief, "the statement that 'it depends'
is an accurate description of the answer to many
questions about media effects."8
The problem for the law and freedom of ex-
pression is clear. When the third-person effect is
coupled with our simplistic assumptions about-the
power of the media, we censor speech because we
assume that it causes harm, regardless of whether
it really does. 84 We assume causation of injury
from speech based on instincts tarnished by
perceptual biases.
Politicians are increasingly driven by numbers
Years in the Marketplace of Ideas, J. COMM., Spring 1993, at 58.
On the other hand, one social scientist who has reviewed the
literature and research on television violence concludes "that
early childhood viewing of mass media violence contributes
[only] five to ten percent to adult aggressive behavior." Ed-
ward Donnerstein, Mass Media Violence: Thoughts on the Debate,
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 827, 829 (1994).
80 See MELVIN L. DEFLEUR & SANDRA J. BALL-ROKEACH,
THEORIES OF MASS COMMUNICATION 196-97 (5th ed. 1989)
(observing that "the principle of selective perception is that
people of distinct psychological characteristics, subcultural
orientations, and social network memberships will interpret
the same media content in very different ways").
81 See Steven H. Chaffee & Connie Roser, Involvement and
the Consistency of Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behaviors, 13 COMM.
RES., 373, 376 (1986) (observing that the concept involve-
ment as a contingent condition governing mass media effects
has been a part of communication research since 1965).
82 See generally RICHARD E. PErrY &JOHN T. CACIOPPo, AT-
TITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY AP-
PROACHES 61-65 (describing the concept of source credibility
and its ability to influence the impact of media messages).
8-3 SEVERIN & TANKARD, supra note 75, at 265. "Contem-
porary analyses of mass media persuasion have focused on
the variables that determine when the media will be effective
versus ineffective and what the underlying processes are by
which the media induce change." Richard E. Petty & Joseph
R. Priester, Mass Media Attitude Change: Implications of the Elab-
oration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in MEDIA EFFECTS: AD-
VANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 91, 94 (Jennings Bryant &
Dolf Zillmann eds., 1994).
84 Assumption of injury from speech is involved in the
traditional "bad tendency" justification for penalizing speech.
See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,
90 YALE L.J. 514, 543 (1981). Likewise, libel law traditionally
has presumed harm from defamatory speech without proof
of actual injury. See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensa-
tion, and Proof 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 748 (1984).
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from public opinion polls when they propose and
craft legislation.8 5 If the public opinion that they
follow is susceptible to the influences of the third-
person effect when it comes to the impact of mass
media messages, an entire body of legislation may
be created that unnecessarily restricts expression.
Michael Schudson observes that "[t] he assump-
tion that gullible others, but not one's own canny
self, are slaves to the media is so widespread that
the actions based on it may be one of the mass
media's most powerful creations."8' 6 Going one
step further, our biased assumptions of the me-
dia's influence affect our restrictions of First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press. Ulti-
mately, the "consequences are costly when ac-
tions, based on inaccurate perceptions of the
opinions of others, take on the force of law."87
Legal scholars, legislators, and judges, of
course, are welcome to consider legal issues of
free speech in a vacuum that ignores real-world
data about media effects. To do so, however,
would be a grave mistake. Free speech is too valu-
85 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DE-
MOCRACY, AND RoMANCE 63 (observing that "[p]oliticians are
to some extent influenced by public opinion, and they
should be"). Some studies have suggested that politicians
are motivated to action based on their beliefs about the pub-
lic's reactions to media messages." Salwen & Driscoll, supra
note 60, at 62. During the 1992 presidential election cam-
paign, for instance, Bill Clinton "followed what the polls told
him, and did well by being a good populist." EDWIN DiA-
MOND & ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, WHITE HOUSE TO YOUR
HOUSE: MEDIA AND POLITICS IN VIRTUAL AMERICA 125 (1995).
able to be suppressed because of ill-formed as-
sumptions about the power of media messages.
The third-person effect literature, in turn, pro-
vides helpful context for legislators who react to
public opinion polls and their perceptions about
how other people are influenced by the media. It
can provide the kind of "enlightened skepticism"
about our current rules and restrictions on
speech that former United States Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes found so valuable
to the development of the law. 88
In summary, our perceptual biases about media
harms may create and perpetuate entire areas of
law that are both unnecessary and unfounded.
They should not. As Abraham Kaplan wrote more
than thirty years ago, it "is absurd to make claims
about matters which depend on evidence and yet
ignore the scientific attempt to get the evi-
dence."8 9 There must be, in other words, a "trans-
action between social science and social policy."911
The research on the third-person effect must be
part of that transaction.
Today, "no one doubts the importance of polling and other
forms of 'interactivity' in the Clinton White House." Id. at
126.
86 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF NEWS 121 (1995).
87 Cohen et al., supra note 29, at 173.
88 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
89 Abraham Kaplan, Behavioral Science and the Law, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 67 (1967).
90 RICHARD P. NATHAN, SOCIAL. SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT:
USES AND MISUES 4 (1988).
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